Pacific. These include a lack of formalized SPP guidance and metrics; marginalization of the National Guard within Asia Pacific; lack of training and an established career path for Soldiers and Airmen who implement the program; a lack of understanding of the economic benefits of Asia Pacific partnerships; and policies and perceptions that limit the program's ability to engage countries such as China. Some of these issues affect the program as a whole, regardless of the region in which it is implemented.
The State Partnership Program and Asia Pacific Overview
While many senior Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and National Guard leaders are familiar with the SPP, most do not have a clear understanding of the program's mission, goals, objectives, and funding sources. For example, Major General Mathews, Deputy Commander, USARPAC, noted, "The current program is Cold War centric." 3 The absences of clear program guidance and metrics, combined with a misunderstanding of the program itself, fuel this perception. This overview will summarize the SPP, discuss its genesis and expansion, describe the program's goals and objectives, and highlight the importance of the Asia Pacific. This overview will also address some of the criticisms intertwined within the program and its apprehension to change.
State Partnership Program Overview
The National Guard's SPP, a Joint Security Cooperation program under the direction of the DoD, uses Army and Air National Guard resources to support military-to-military engagements. The SPP also leverages relationships with civilian contacts at the state and local level, and with private organizations to support civilian-to-military and civilian-3 to-civilian engagements. These three engagement types are used to achieve Geographical Combatant Commanders' (GCC) and DoS Chiefs of Mission security cooperation goals. Civilian engagements are not supported with DoD funding, but are a key aspect of programmatic success because they bring additional capabilities and experiences not available within the National Guard. The SPP uses a soft power approach and aids the DoD and DoS by "strengthening relationships with partners to facilitate cooperation, access, and interoperability; improving cultural awareness and skills among U.S. military personnel; and fostering the integration of reserve and active component forces into a 'total force.'" 4
Genesis and Expansion of the State Partnership Program
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the DoD developed the Joint Contact
Team Program to increase military-to-military contact, establish relationships, and foster democratic governance in former Warsaw Pact countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Ukraine. 5 In 1992, when the North Atlantic Cooperation Council asked the DoD to assist Latvia with Military Support to Civil Authorities training-a traditional National Guard mission-the DoD turned to the National Guard to develop the training. 6 The training was considered a success and laid the foundation for the development of the SPP. In 1993 the National Guard developed a proposal to partner with 13 former Central and Eastern European countries. The International Working
Group, at the time the leading organization for all engagements with Warsaw Pact countries, and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) approved the proposal, and the SPP was established. However, the Vice Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., noted that the SPP has "proven to be a very, very valuable high-leverage tool for us, … so we plan to build on things like that to help us on these innovative approaches to other parts of the world." 11 To his point, interest in the program's practicality and economy of force approach has created resurgence throughout the DoD. This resurgence highlights the value the SPP provides to all GCCs and makes the argument to refocus the program to Asia Pacific even more difficult, as it seems unlikely the GCCs would want to see their SPP resources shift or reduced to support the rebalance efforts.
Furthermore, given the reduction in defense spending directed by the Budget Control Act of 2011, GCCs must assess the impact a reduction of funds allocated to support the SPP will have on their security cooperation programs.
State Partnership Program Goals and Funding
For well over a decade the SPP worked in an ambiguous environment with little oversight by the DoD. Within this environment, NGB and the states developed an
unconventional, yet effective process to meet the needs of the GCCs, Department of State Chiefs of Mission, and partner nations. While efforts to formalize the SPP have been attempted, the SPP never gained the structure commensurate with a formalized program. Figure 2 illustrates the vague goals developed by NGB in its Program Goals
Fiscal Year 2008-2013, which was disseminated to the states in 2007.
Goal #1: Build partnership capacity to deter, prevent, and prepare.
Goal #2: Build partnership capacity to respond and recover.
Goal #3: Support partners' defense reform and professional development.
Goal #4: Enable and facilitate enduring broad-spectrum security relationships. These unconventional processes created a perception that the SPP implemented security cooperation engagements in an unfocused way and operated on the fringes of accountability. This perception is perpetuated by ongoing investigations designed to determine if DoD funds were used to support past military-to-civilian and civilian-tocivilian engagements, both not permissible under the National Defense Authorization Act. 13 To combat this perception and to provide guidance on what is permissible, the Figure 3 illustrates fund management. The "SPP Engagement" account is the largest of these three accounts, and is evenly divided among the 65 existing partnerships. The allocation of funds supports one senior leader engagement and two one-week engagements, comprised of five Soldiers or Airmen, per year. Engagements above and beyond these three types of engagements require additional funding from either the DoD or the GCCs. The second account supports DoD or GCC strategic priorities. USPACOM will receive a 15% increase in funds in comparison to other GCCs in FY13 to support the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance emphasis to rebalance to the Pacific. 17 GCCs, in conjunction with the NGB, determine the focus for the engagement and the anticipated outcome. The final, and smallest, account supports the development of future partnerships. NGB's current plan is to add two new partnerships per year, until it reaches between 100 and 125 partners, which is the maximum number of engagements the NGB believes it can support. 18 Some GCCs provide additional funds to support an expanded emphasis of the SPP within its own area of operation. This additional emphasis, however, causes a perception that certain geographical regions receive more funds than others.
The Asia Pacific Region
Why is the Asia Pacific region important to the U.S.? Using the boundaries of USPACOM's area of operation, the Asia Pacific region covers 50% of the earth's surface, is home to 36 countries, and includes the world's four largest nations: China, India, Indonesia, and the United States. The region comprises half of the world's population who speak over 3,000 languages. 19 It is home to the three largest economies in the world: the U.S., China, and Japan. In 2011, these countries comprised 40% of the 9 world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) totaling $28.2797 trillion in current U.S. dollars. 20 The Asia Pacific region is also home to seven of the ten largest armies in the world and various territorial disputes and regional flashpoints. 21 The confluence of these dynamics influences international order and the U.S.'s security and prosperity, especially when pundits see the U.S. declining in both economic and regional influence. As China continues to grow as a political, economic, and military regional power, its capability to influence the region grows as well.
According to the structural theory concept of offensive realism, China desires four end states: to secure regional hegemony, maximize control of wealth, secure pre-eminent regional military might through a powerful land army, and attain nuclear superiority. 22 As China's power rises, the U.S. must increase its engagements in the region commensurate with the potential threat to ensure it maintains influence in Asia Pacific.
The SPP assists in achieving this objective by developing partnerships and building partner capacity, thereby increasing stability, security, and regional influence. Shifting the emphasis of the SPP to Asia Pacific can and must be successfully implemented.
Issues Affecting the SPP Rebalance
As identified above, five core issues hamper shifting the SPP emphasis to Asia
Pacific. The benefits of resolving these issues and shifting the focus of this economy of force program are significant to the U.S., its partner nations, and to the longevity of the program itself. The following section examines these core issues, provides recommended solutions to overcome them, and addresses a way to bring about the required change.
Core Issues

Formalized Guidance and Metrics
Aligning the SPP to the Asia Pacific region is in the best interests of the program, the U.S., and partner nations in the region. Since its inception, the employment of SPP capabilities in the types of ambiguous environments consistent with the nature of the post-Cold War era relied on empowering leadership techniques that necessitated implementing the program in a decentralized manner, relying on small-unit actions to achieve strategic level objectives. This empowering approach allowed for creativity and flexibility, and presented opportunities for states to leverage resources within their capabilities. The international community recognized the merit of the program and participating states' desire to achieve desirable outcomes. As a result, the SPP expanded to every GCC within 12 years. Figure 4 illustrates the proposed mission statement and supporting goals for the SPP.
Mission: Support United States Combatant Command's security cooperation goals and objectives by providing a consistent and stabilizing presence abroad, reinforcing deterrence, building capacity of U.S. and partner countries for internal and external defense, strengthening alliances, and increasing U.S. influence.
Goal #1: Educate and train National Guard forces for conducting security cooperation activities.
Goal #2: Sustain and strengthen enduring relationships and build partner capacity.
Goal #3: Advance geographic combatant commander and ambassador security cooperation goals.
Goal #4: Posture to adeptly respond to future global scenario by ensuring the program is synchronized with National, DoD, and Joint strategies. The point in making this observation is not to debate the merits of the SPP itself; sufficient evidence suggests that the program is extremely successful. Rather, the point in highlighting this issue is that the SPP works within a resource-constrained environment and cannot afford to funnel funds or resources into a partnership that is not productive. The establishment of evaluation criteria will assist in this effort. By establishing a set of defined metrics, senior leaders will have the tools required to make informed decisions, therefore providing further legitimacy to the program. Otherwise, decisions will be based on subjective perceptions and opacity.
How should NGB go about developing these assessment metrics?
A regionally based assessment process that integrates input from participating states, GCCs, and
Chiefs of Mission within that region is a viable option. Applying a cookie-cutter approach of assessing success will not work because what is suitable in USEUCOM may not be suitable in USSOUTHCOM. This recommendation nests well with NGB's goal of advancing the GCCs and ambassador's security cooperation goals. This assessment 14 approach also provides senior leaders with a useful tool to make informed decisions.
This type of assessment methodology also provides leaders with the information and ability to determine if a relationship requires expansion, reduction, or abandonment.
Finally, NGB needs to develop disengagement criteria. While the majority of the partnerships will continue to last for years, there will come a point when reduced partnering or graduation from a partnership is prudent. In my opinion, NGB is apprehensive to broach this subject for fear it will somehow precipitate a "beginning of on hold because he thinks it will require a rewrite once he receives further guidance from General Grass. 30 The development of the SPP Strategic Plan is the step in the right direction. This document provides updated missions, goals, and objectives. It begins the process of eliminating ambiguity and provides a framework for states to work within as they implement the program at the lowest level. However, the document needs additional guidance to include selection, evaluation, and disengagement criteria. This additional information will provide the oversight required of a program that spends congressional funds, enhances the program's legitimacy in the eyes of OSD and DoD, and provides states a framework to work within.
Marginalization of the National Guard in Asia Pacific
One aspect governors and Adjutants General worry about is the perceived marginalization of the National Guard within the Asia Pacific region. Army's meeting a "total force policy" to better integrate the Active and Reserve
Components. 35 Secretary McHugh noted:
Since America was first attacked in 2001 one of the most important things we learned is how critical an operational reserve is to our ability to do mission requirements. It is paramount to keep the reserve well trained in order to keep the nation secure. 36 The Army now has an opportunity to achieve this end state. Through the continued use of National Guard forces in bilateral training exercises within the USPACOM area of operation, the Army can better align with strategic level guidance, and ultimately keep the nation more secure. These training opportunities would maintain and achieve the readiness and training standards required in Army Regulation 220-1 (Army Unit Status Administrative Support Services (ICASS) costs. This is the DoS billing mechanism for Embassy-provided services. This cost is estimated as $125,000 per BAO for a projected total of $500,000 per year. 43 To date, USPACOM has been unwilling to assume these costs and NGB and USPACOM find themselves in an impasse. The following update from NGB notes the current status of placing BAOs within the region:
In a draft Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) between NGB-J5 and PACOM, the NGB has proposed resourcing four Bilateral Affairs Officers (BAOs) to reside at PACOM-J4/5 for three years. This interim plan provides PACOM J4/5 the opportunity to gain the benefits of employing BAOs in the AO and additional time to program in-country costs associated with supporting BAOs in their partner country. Although NGB has offered to use current-execution-year funding to expedite the MoA, PACOM has not programmed for the long-term in-country costs. To date, the MoA has not been signed-primarily due to uncertainty in PACOMs future resources. importantly, it provides a method through which the DoD can achieve one of its Defense Strategic Guidance's missions: providing a stabilized presence in the region and ensuring continued stability.
Training and Career Path
One way to successfully cultivate effective and long-term partnerships is to train 
Economic Benefit
As noted earlier in this document, it may be impractical for states with existing partnerships to eliminate these relationships and establish new ones in Asia Pacific. To this point, there must be an incentive for governors and Adjutants General to assume an additional partnership in the Asia Pacific region. One such incentive would be economics.
The SPP supports improvements in trade relations between the U.S. and partner nations, benefits both national and state economies, and supports regional prosperity.
For example, in 2011 the U.S. exported $2.1 trillion in goods and services supporting an estimated 9.7 million jobs in the United States. 52 Therefore, the U.S. must maintain a presence in the Asia Pacific region to enable our trade interests. As Max Weber, a renowned sociologist and political economist said, "National self-preservation and economic growth are two sides of the same coin." 53 With the economic downturn of 2008, the U.S. GDP dropped to an annual rate of 6.3% and corporate profits plummeted $250.3 billion in the fourth quarter of that year. 54 States and the federal government also suffered significant losses in tax revenue. While the economy has not regained its previous strength as of 2013, the opportunity to increase trade and government tax revenue is one benefit the SPP brings to the table. incorporates the provincial states, providing access to provincial leaders. Figure 5 illustrates the military regions and the provinces within them. Historically, the process of initiating a partnership begins once a nation state asks for one. As noted earlier, China will not seek out a partnership because its perception is that the relationship must exist between a state and the central government of a nation state. Therefore, NGB and the DoD must take the initiative and approach China.
Ambassador Gary Locke, current ambassador to China and the former Governor of the caused senior leaders to re-examine how they will implement security cooperation programs as a part of the overall National Defense Strategy. While the Asia Pacific region represents significant economic and security interests to the U.S., especially when China continues to grow as a political, economic, and military regional power, the U.S. still has responsibilities and requirements within the other GCCs. To influence not only the efforts within all the GCCs, but also a specific emphasis in Asia Pacific, five core issues require resolution. NGBs must develop an SPP Strategic Plan that clearly defines the program's mission, goals, selection criteria, assessment metrics, and disengagement criteria to ensure everyone is working towards a common end state.
These metrics and criteria will assist in placing the program's limited resources where they will have the greatest effect. In addition, NGB and the states must work with the USPACOM and USARPAC Commanders to build trust and comprehensive integration of National Guard Soldiers within the region. Otherwise, reluctance on the part of the governors and Adjutants General will limit the future expansion of partnerships within
Asia Pacific. The current training methodology and career paths for SPPC, BAOs, and
TCAs requires a complete revamp. Foundational cultural and language training and an established career path will build the expertise to prepare individuals before they assume their roles and responsibilities in an SPP engagement. In conjunction with selection criteria, a better understanding of the economic benefits a partnership could bring to the nation and the state needs to be expanded. This understanding will assist not only in the continued prosperity of the U.S., but also will increase the prosperity for the partner nation's populace. Finally, policy, perception, and a modification as to how and whom NGB engages via the SPP must change within DoD, DoS, and NGB itself.
The SPP has tremendous capabilities that are not currently being used to their fullest potential. This limitation hampers the program's ability to engage countries like China.
Changes in these five core areas will not only make the SPP the security cooperation
